John Locke, "Of Civil Government" (The Second Treatise of Government)
![John Locke, by Godfrey Kneller, about 1697. [Wikimedia Commons]](http://virginia-anthology.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/JohnLocke.png)
Two Treatises of Government in 1689. This was not long after the bloodless coup that brought William and Mary to power, at which point they seemed to be ratifications of the revolution against the alleged tyranny of the Stuart monarch James II. We offer here only the second, far more widely influential treatise. The text is adapted from the Text Creation Partnership edition.
BOOK. II.
CHAP. I.
1. It having been shewn in the foregoing Discourse.
1o. That Adam had not either by natural Right of Fatherhood, or by positive Donation from God, any such Authority over his Children, nor Dominion over the World as is pretended.
2o. That if he had his Heirs, yet, had no Right to it.
3o. That if his Heirs had, there being no Law of Nature nor positive Law of God that determins, which is the Right Heir in all Cases that may arise, the Right of Succession, and consequently of bearing Rule, could not have been certainly determined.
4o. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the Eldest Line of Adams Posterity, being so long since utterly lost that in the Races of Mankind and Families of the World, there remains not to
one above another, the least pretence to be the Eldest House, and to have the Right of Inheritance.
Sr. Robt F. hath taught us.
Children, a Master over his Servant, a Husband over his Wife, and a Lord over his Slave. All which distinct Powers happening sometimes together in the same Man, if he be considered under these different Relations, it may help us to distinguish these Powers one from another, and shew the difference betwixt a Ruler of a Common-wealth, a Father of a Family, and a Captain of a Gally.
3. Political Power, then I take to be a Right of making Laws with Penalties of death, and consequently all less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of Property, and of employing the force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and in the defence of the Common-wealth from Foreign Injury, and all this only for the Public Good.
CHAP. II. Of the State of Nature.
To understand Political Power a right, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what Estate all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.
them all, should by any manifest Declaration of his Will set one above another, and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted Right to Dominion and Sovereignty.
and infinitely wise maker: All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his business. They are his Property, whose Workmanship they are made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure. And being Furnished with like Faculties, sharing all in one Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such Subordination among us, that may Authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one anothers uses, as the inferior ranks of Creatures are for ours, every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station willfully, so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of Mankind, and not unless it be to do Justice on an offender, take a way, or impair the the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another.
Mankind, the Execution of the Law of Nature is in that State, put into every Mans hands, whereby every one has a Right to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its Violation. For the Law of Nature would, as all other Laws that concern Men in this World, be in vain, if there were no body that in the State of Nature, had a Power to Execute that Law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders, and if any one in the State of Nature may punish another, for any evil he has done, every one may do so. For in that State of perfect Equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in Prosecution of that Law, every one must needs have a Right to do.
to his Transgression, which is so much as may serve for Reparation and Restraint. For these two are the only reasons, why one Man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In trangressing the Law of Nature, the Offender declares himself to live by another Rule, then that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the actions of Men, for their mutual security, and so he becomes dangerous to Mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by him, which being a trespass against the whole Species, and the Peace and Safety of it, provided for by the Law of Nature, every Man upon this score, by the Right he hath to preserve Mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that Law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his Example others, from doing the like mischief. And in this case, and upon this ground, every Man hath a Right to punish the Offender, and be Executioner of the Law of Nature.
Mankind, hath by the unjust violence and slaughter, he hath committed upon one, declared War against all Mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a Lion or a Tiger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security: And upon this is grounded that great Law of Nature, who so sheddeth Mans Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a Right to destroy such a Criminal, that after the Murther of his Brother, he cries out, every one that findeth me, shall slay me, so plain was it writ in the Hearts of all Mankind.
naturally induced to seek Communion and Fellowship with others, this was the Cause of Mens uniting themselves, at first in Politic Societies. But I Moreover affirm, that all Men are naturally in that State, and remain so till by their own consents, they make themselves Members of some Politic Society, and I doubt not in the Sequel of this Discourse, to make it very clear.
20. But when the actual force is over, the State of War ceases between those that are in Society, and are equally on both sides Subject to the Judge: And therefore in such controversies, where the question is put, who shall be Iudge? It cannot be meant, who shall decide the controversie: every one knows what Iephtha here tells us, that the Lord the Iudge, shall Judge. Where there is no Judge on Earth, the Appeal lies to God in Heaven. That question then cannot mean who shall Judge, whether another hath put himself in a State of War with me, and whether I may as Iephtha did appeal to Heaven in it? Of that I my self can only be Judge in my own Conscience, as I will answer it at the great day, to the Supream Judge of all Men.
CHAP. IV. Of SLAVERY.
Sr. R. F. tells us, O. A. 55. A Liberty for every one to do what he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tyed by any Laws: but Freedom of Men, under Government, is, to have a standing Rule to live by, common to every one of that Society, and made by the Legislative Power erected in it. A Liberty to follow my own Will in all things, where that Rule prescribes not; not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of another Man. As Freedom of Nature is to be under no other restraint but the Law of Nature.
Exod.. XXI.
Ambergriese any one takes up here, is by the labour that removes it out of that common state Nature left it in, made his Property who takes that pains about it. And even amongst us the Hare that any one is Hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the Chase. For being a Beast that is still looked upon as common, and no Man’s private Possession; who-ever has imploy’d so much labour about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of Nature wherein she was common, and hath began a Property.
1 Tim. vi. 12. Is the Voice of Reason confirmed by Inspiration. But how far has he given it us, to enjoy? As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy. And thus considering the plenty of natural Provisions there was a long time in the World, and the few spenders, and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one Man could extend it self, and ingross it to the prejudice of others; especially keeping within the bounds set by reason of what might serve for his use; there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about Property so establish’d.
improve it for the benefit of Life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that in obedience to this Command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his Property, which another had no Title to, nor could without injury take from him.
viz.) that every Man should have as much as he could make use of, would
Gen. xiii. 5. separated and inlarged their Pasture, where it best liked Gen. xxxvi. 6.
of labour makes the far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest Computation to say, that of the Products of the Earth useful to the Life of Man 9/10 are the effects of labour: nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use, and cast up the several expences about them, what in them is purely owing to Nature, and what to labour, we shall find, that in most of them 99/100 are wholly to be put on the account of labour.
common: Man (by being Master of himself, and Proprietor of his own Person, and the Actions or Labour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Property: and that which made up the great part of what he applyed to the Support or Comfort of his being, when Invention and Arts had improved the conveniencies of Life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.
47. And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep without spoiling, and that, by mutual consent, Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable Supports of Life.
middle of the in-land Parts of America, where he had no hopes of Commerce with other parts of the World, to draw Money to him, by the Sale of the Product. It would not be worth the inclosing, and we should see him give up again to the wild Common of Nature what-ever was more than would supply the Conveniencies of Life, to be had there, for him and his Family.
CHAP. VI. Of Paternal Power.
56. Adam was created a perfect Man, his Body and Mind in full possession of their Strength and Reason, and so was capable, from the first Instance of his being, to provide for his own Support and Preservation, and govern his Actions according to the Dictates of the Law of Reason God had implanted in him. From him the World is peopled with his Descendants, who are all born Infants, weak and helpless, without Knowledge or Understanding. But to supply the Defects of this imperfect State, till the improvement of Growth and Age had removed them, Adam and Eve, and after them all Parents were, by the Law of Nature, under an Obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate the Children they had begotten, not as their own Workmanship, but the Workmanship of their own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them. so far forth the use of Reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those Laws whereby he is then bound to guide his Actions: this is a great deal more easie for sense to discern, than for any one, by Skill and Learning, to determine. 62. Commonwealths themselves take notice of, and allow, that there is a time when Men are to begin to act like Free Men, and therefore, till that time, require not Oaths of Fealty or Allegiance, or other publick owning of, or Submission to the Government of their Countreys. to temper this power, to apply it as his Wisdom designed it, to the Childrens good, as long as they should need to be under it.
his Children had laid by the Exercise of such a Power, to give way to the Dignity and Authority they were willing should remain in him above the rest of his Family.
CHAP. VII. Of Political or Civil Society.
her numerous Off-spring, by her own Prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on Grass: the Assistance of the Male is necessary to the Maintenance of their common Family, which cannot subsist, till they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joint Care of Male and Female. The same is to be observed in all Birds (except some domestick ones, where plenty of food excuses the Cock from feeding, and taking care of the young Brood) whose Young needing Food in the Nest, the Cock and Hen continue Mates till the Young are able to use their wing, and provide for themselves.
foregoing Chapter, that I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far different from a politick Society.
and decide any difference between them there, those persons are still in the state of nature. And so is every absolute Prince in respect of those who are under his Dominion.
from the common state of rational Creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or defend his Right, and so is exposed to all the Misery and Inconveniencies that a Man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of Nature, is yet corrupted with Flattery, and armed with Power.
CHAP. VIII. Of the Beginning of Political Societies.
state of Nature. For what appearance would there be of any Compact? What new engagement, if he were no farther tied by any Decrees of the Society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty as he himself had before his Compact, or any one else in the state of Nature, who may submit himself and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit.
99. Whosoever therefore, out of a state of Nature, unite into a Community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into Society, to the majority of the Community, unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political Society, which is all the Compact that is, or needs be, beneonate the individuals that enter into or make up a Commonwealth. And thus that which begins and actually constitutes any Political Society, is nothing but the consent of any number of Freemen capable of majority, to unite and incorporate into such a Society. And this is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any lawful Government in the World.
of such instances be an argument to prove, that Government were not, nor could not be so begun, I suppose the Contenders for Paternal Empire were better let it alone, than urge it against natural Liberty. For if they can give so many instances out of History, of Governments began upon paternal Right, I think (though at least an Argument from what has been, to what should of right, be of no great force) one might, without any great danger, yield them the cause. But if I might advise them in the Case, they would do well not to search too much into the original of Governments, as they have begun de facto, lest they should find at the foundation of most of them, something very little favourable to the design they promote, and such a power as they contend for.
reason to conclude, that all peaceful beginnings of Government have been laid in the Consent of the People. I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion, in another place, to speak of Conquest, which some esteem a way of beginning of Governments. The other Objection, I find, urged against the beginning of Polities, in the way I have mentioned, is this, viz. of another may be so free too, and may become a Ruler, or Subject, of a distinct separate Government. And so by this their own Principle, either all Men however born are free, or else there is but one lawful Prince, one lawful Government in the World. And then they have nothing to do but barely to shew us which that is. Which when they have done, I doubt not but all Mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him.
116. This has been the practice of the World from its first beginning to this day: nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of Mankind, that they are born under constituted and ancient Polities, and, in Effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the Territories of that Government.
which makes any one a Member of any Commonwealth.
nursing Fathers: without this care of the Governours, all Governments would have sunk under the Weakness and Infirmities of their Infancy, the Prince and the People had soon perished together.
he may dispose or settle it as he pleases.
as the Community, or those authorised by them, to that purpose shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the Legislative and Executive Power, as well as of the Governments and Societies themselves.
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148. Though, as I said, the Executive and Federative Power of every Community
CHAP. XIII. Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Commonwealth.149. THough in a Constituted Commonwealth, standing upon its own Basis, and acting according to its own nature, that is, acting for the preservation of the Community, there can be but one Supream Power, which is the Legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the People a
152. The Executive Power placed any where but in a Person that has also a share in the Legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it, and may be at pleasure
153. It is not necessary, no nor so much as convenient, that the Legislative should be always in being. But absolutely necessary, that the Executive Power should, because there is not always need of new Laws to be made, but always need of Execution of the Laws that are made. When
155. It may be demanded here, what if the Executive Power, being possessed of the force of the Commonwealth, shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the Legislative, when the original Constitution, or the publick
156. The Power of Assembling, and dismissing the Legislative, placed in the Executive, gives not the Executive a superiority over it, but is a Fiduciary Trust placed in him for the safety of the People, in a Case where the uncertainty and variableness of humane affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule. For it not being possible, that the first Framers of the Government, should by any foresight, be so much
162. It is easy to conceive, that in the Infancy of Governments, when Commonwealths
164. But since a Rational Creature cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into Subjection to another, for his own harm: (though where he finds a good and a wise Ruler, he may not, perhaps, think it either necessary or useful to set precise Bounds to his Power in all things) Prerogative can be nothing but the Peoples permitting their Rulers to do several things of their own free choice, where the Law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct Letter of the Law, for the publick good, and their acquiescing in it when so done. For as a good Prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of the good of his People, cannot have too much Prerogative, that is, Power to do good: So a weak and ill Prince, who would claim that Power his Predecessors exercised, without the direction of the Law, as a Prerogative belonging to him by Right of his Office, which he may exercise at his pleasure, to make or promote an Interest distinct from that of the publick, gives the People an occasion to claim their Right, and limit that Power, which, whilst it was exercised for their good, they were content should be tacitly allowed.165. And therefore he that will look into the History of England will find that
166. Such God-like Princes indeed had some Title to Arbitrary Power, by that Argument that would prove Absolute Monarchy the best Government, as that which God himself governs the Universe by, because such Kings partake of his Wisdom and Goodness. Upon this is founded that saying, That the Reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to the Liberties of their People. For when their Successors, managing the Government
167. The Power of calling Parliaments in England, as to precise time, place, and duration, is certainly a Prerogative of the King, but still with this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the Nation, as the exigencies of the Times, and variety of Occasion shall require. For it being impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble
in, and what the best season: the choice of these was left with the Executive Power, as might be best subservient to the publick good, and best suit the ends of Parliaments.168. The old Question will be asked in this matter of Prerogative, But who shall be Judge when this Power is made a right use of? I answer: Between an Executive Power in being, with such a Prerogative, and a Legislative, that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be no Judge on Earth. As there can be none between the Legislative and the People, should either the executive, or the Legislative, when they have got the Power in their hands, design, or go about to enslave or destroy them. The People have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases, where they have no Judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven. For the Rulers, in such attempts, exercising a Power the people never put into their hands, who can never be supposed to consent that any body should rule over them for their harm, do that which they have not a right to do. And where the Body of the People, or any single Man, are deprived of their Right, or are under the Exercise of a power without right, having no Appeal on earth, they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven, when-ever they judge the Cause
CHAP. XV. Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power, considered together.169. THough I have had occasion to speak of these separately before, yet the great mistakes, of late, about Government, having, as I suppose, arisen from confounding these distinct Powers one with another, it may not, perhaps, be amiss, to consider them here together.
171. Secondly, Political Power is that Power, which every Man, having in the state of Nature, has given up into the hands of the Society, and therein to the Governours, whom the Society hath set over it self, with this express, or tacit Trust, That it shall be imployed for their good, and the preservation of their Property: Now this Power, which every Man has in the state of Nature, and which he parts with to the Society, in all such cases where the Society can secure him,
172. Thirdly, Despotical Power is an Absolute, Arbitrary Power, one Man has over another, to take away his Life whenever
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191. By the first of these, a Man is naturally free from subjection to any Government, though he be born in a place under its Jurisdiction. But if he disclaim the lawful Government of the Countrey
194. Their Persons are free, by a native Right, and their Properties, be they
most solemn way of conveyance can be devised: and yet it is to be understood, that I have Right, if I please, to take it away from you again to morrow?195. I will not dispute now whether Princes are exempt from the Laws of their Countrey, but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the Laws of God, and Nature. No Body, no Power can exempt them from the Obligations of that Eternal Law. Those are so great, and so strong, in the case of Promises, that Omnipotency it self can be tyed by them. Grants, Promises, and Oaths are Bonds that hold the Almighty: what-ever some Flatterres say to Princes of the World, who, all together, with all their People joined to them, are, in comparison of the great God, but as a Drop of the Bucket, or a Dust on the Balance, inconsiderable, nothing!
196. The short of the Case, in Conquest, is this, The Conquerour, if he have a just Cause, has a Despotical Right over the Persons of all that actually aided, and concurred in the War against him, and a Right to make up his Damage and Cost, out of their Labour and Estates, so he injure not the Right of any other. Over the rest of the People, if there were any that consented not to the War, and
198. In all lawful Governments the designation of the Persons, who are to bear Rule, being as natural and necessary a the Decemviri, at Rome, was nothing better.
203. May the Commands then of a Prince be opposed? May he be resisted, as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved, and but imagine he has not Right done him? This will unhinge and overturn all Politi
any Prince have so much Weakness, and ill Nature as to be willing to do it. The Inconveniency of some particular mischiefs that may happen, sometimes, when a heady Prince comes to the Throne, are well recompenced by the peace of the Publick, and security of the Government, in the Person of the chief Magistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger. It being safer for the Body, that some few private Men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than that the Head of the Republick should be easily, and upon slight occasions exposed.
• 216. Thirdly, When, by the Arbitrary Power of the Prince, the Electours, or ways of Election are altered, without the Consent, and contrary to the common Interest of the People, there also the Legislative is altered. For if others, then those whom the Society hath authorized thereunto, do chuse, or in another way than what the Society hath prescribed, those chosen are not the Legislative appointed by the People. 218. Why, in such a Constitution as this, the Dissolution of the Government, in these Cases, is to be imputed to the Prince, is evident, because he having the Force, Treasure, and Offices of the State, to imploy, and often perswading himself,
as great and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult. •
231. That Subjects or Foreigners attempting by force, on the Properties of any People, may be resisted with force, is agreed on all hands. But that Magistrates, • Barclay contra Monarchom. l. 3. c. 8. 234. Thus far that great Advocate of Monarchical Power allows of Resistance. First, He says, it must be with Reverence. Quid ergo, nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere at que que que que que que que que Alexandriam commigrare, ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret, unam ei cervicem optavit. Talia cum rex aliquis meditatur 237. should appeal to the Supreme Judge, as Iephtha did. 243. To conclude, The Power that every
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s, and, instead of Government and Order, leave nothing but Anarchy and Confusion.
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the benefit of appealing to the Law, and have Reparation, for my 100l. that way.
impose any thing upon them. Every one is at the disposure of his own Will, when those, who had, by the delegation of the Society, the declaring of the publick Will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have no such Authority or Delegation.213. This being usually brought about by such, in the Commonwealth, who mis-use the Power they have: It is hard to consider it aright, and know at whose door to lay it, without knowing the Form of Government in which it happens. Let us suppose then the Legislative placed in the Concurrence of three distinct Persons. First, A single, hereditary Person having the constant, supream, executive Power, and, with it, the Power of convoking, and dissolving the other two, within certain Periods of Time. Secondly, An Assemby of hereditary Nobility. Thirdly, An Assembly of Representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the People: Such a Form of Government supposed, it is evident,214. First, That when such a single Person, or Prince sets up his own Arbitrary Will, in place of the Laws, which are the Will of the Society, declared by the Legislative, then the Legislative is changed. For that being, in effect, the
of the Legislative in its due seasons, in effect takes away the Legislative, and puts an end to the Government.
220. In these, and the like Cases, when the Government is dissolved, the People are at liberty to provide for themselves,
First, The Legislative acts against the Trust reposed in them, when they
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deavour to invade the Property of the Subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the Community, Masters, or Arbitrary Disposers of the Lives, Liberties, or Fortunes of the People.
doing the same thing, may be resisted, hath of late been denied: As if those who had the greatest Priviledges and Advantages by the Law, had thereby a Power to break those Laws, by which alone they were set in a better place than their Brethren: whereas their Offence is thereby the greater, both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the Law, and breaking also that Trust which is put into their hands by their Brethren.
His Words are these.
que
que
tueamur. Alterum vero contra naturam, ut inserior de superiori supplicium sumat. Quod itaque populus malum, antequam factum sit, impedire
potest, ne fiat, id postquam factum est, in Regem authorem sceleris vindicare non potest: populus igitur hoc ampliùs quam privatus quispiam habet: Quod huic, vel ipsis adversariis judicibus, excepto Buchanano, nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest. Cùm ille si intolerabilis tyrannis est (modicum enim ferre omnino debet) resistere cum reverentiâ possit,
In English thus:
— Libertas pauperis haec est:
Pulsatus rogat, & pugnis concisus, adorat,
Vt liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.
This will always be the event of such an imaginary Resistance, where Men may not strike again. He therefore who may resist, must be allowed to strike. And then let our Author, or any Body else, join a Knock on the Head, or a Cut on the Face, with as much Reverence, and Respect as he thinks fit. He that can reconcile Blows and Reverence, may, for ought I know, deserve for his pains, a Civil, Respectful Cudgelling, where-ever he can meet with it.
que
que
que
que
Romanum, at
adeo urbem ipsam ferro flamma
vastare, ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset. Et de Caligula, quod palam denunciarit se ne
civem ne
principem senatui amplius fore, in
animo habuerit, interempto utrius
ordinis Electissimo quo
236. Alt
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que
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tineat, nec in eum cui collatum voluit, juris quicquam transera
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que
Barclay contra Monarchom. l. 3. c. 16. which may be thus Englished.What then, Can there no Case happen wherein the people may of right, and by their own Authority, help themselves, take Arms, and set upon their King, imperiously domineering over them? None at all, whilst he remains a King. Honour the King, and he that resists the
Power, resists the Ordinance of God; are divine Oracles that will never permit it. The People therefore can never come by a Power over him, unless he does something that makes him cease to be a King. For then he divests himself of his Crown and Dignity, and returns to the state of a private Man, and the People become free and superiour; the Power which they had in the Interregnum, before they Crown’d him King, devolving to them again. But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state. After considering it well on all sides, I can find but two. Two Cases there are, I say, whereby a King, ipso facto, becomes no King, and loses all Power and Regal Authority over his People; which are also taken notice of by Winzerus. The first is, if he indeavour to overturn the Government, that is, if he have a purpose and design to ruin the Kingdom and Commonwealth, as it is recorded of Nero, that he resolved to cut off the Senate and People of Rome, lay the City wast with Fire and Sword, and then remove to some other place. And of Caligula, that he openly declar’d, that he would be no longer a head to the People or Senate, and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest Men of
both Ranks, and then retire to Alexandria: and he wisht that the People had but one Neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow. Such designs as these, when any King harbours in his thoughts, and seriously promotes, he immediately gives up all care and thought of the Commonwealth; and consequently forfeits the Power of Governing his Subjects, as a Master does the dominion over his Slaves whom he hath abandon’d.
FINIS.